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PRIETARY INTEREST OF UNITED STATES IN CONTINENTAL SHELF
PRECLUDES CLAIMS OF ACQUISITION By PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS.

United States v. Ray (S.D. Fla. 1969).

ATLANTIS, "ISLE OF GOLD"

A permanent injunction recently settled a dispute among
two groups of imaginative entrepreneurs, and the United States

government over construction operations atop coral reefs
situated on the Continental Shelf,' ten miles from the Southeastern2 Florida mainland and four and one-half miles
from Elliot Key, the nearest landward isle3 In United States v.
Ray' the district court found that the coral reefs,' although
I. The Continental Shelf, in a geological-geographical context, is the extension of
the continental land mass, sloping gradually from the low-water line until there is a
marked increase in slope to the depths of the sea. Generally, this marked increase is
found near the 200 meter isobath, but varies in breadth from less than one mile to more
than 800. Grunawalt, The Acquisition of the Resources of the Bottom of the Sea-A
Nest, Frontier of InternationalLaw, 34 MILITARY L. REV. 101, 102 (1966) [hereinafter

cited as Grunawalt]. For discussion of the Continental Shelf in its legal context see text
accompanying notes 32-34 infra.
2. The territorial waters (see infra note 6) on the eastern coast of Florida extend for
three miles as contrasted to the 9 mile width on Florida's western coast bordering the
Gulf of Mexico. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2) (1964).
3. The reefs are shown on United States Coast and Geodetic Survey Chart No. 1249
(1967), and lie east of a series of island keys. Both the keys and the reefs parallel the
southeastern tip of Florida.
Studies of these reefs indicate that they underlie the span between the outer reef
formation and the coast and that they form the subsoil of the mainland. L. AGASSIZ,
REPORT ON THE FLORIDA REEFS (1880); GEOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA, LIVING &
FOSSIL REEF TYPES OF SOUTHERN FLORIDA (1964).

The Continental Shelf in this area begins at a point three miles distant from the lowwater line on the seaward side of the keys. The keys were included in the cession of
Florida to the United States from Spain. Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Feb.
22, 1819, 8 STAT. 252, 254 (1846), T.S. No. 327 (effective Feb. 19, 1821). The keys are
also the point from which the baseline is drawn. Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone, Article 4, Sept. 15, 1958 [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639
[hereinafter cited as Convention on the Territorial Sea].
4. 294 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Fla. 1969). Defendants in this action are Louis M. Ray,
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outside the nation's territorial waters, ' were nevertheless within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

Prior to the commencement of the enjoined activities,
Atlantis Corporation, 7 intervenor in the RaY case, had sought
permission for its operations s from the State of Florida, the
Department of the Interior and the Department of State.' Upon
being informed that the areas in question were outside the

jurisdiction of the State of Florida and the United States,"' the
area was surveyed and operations begun."
Atlantis brought buildings to the reef area and had
commenced their installation on Triumph and Long reefs when a
hurricane washed the buildings out to sea. Atlantis was notified
by the Corps of Engineers that it had violated the law by
resident of Louisiana, and Acme General Contractors. Inc., a Florida Corporation.
Intervenor, Atlantis Development Corporation. Ltd., is a Bahama corporation.
5. The reefs involved in this dispute are Triumph, Long, Ajax and an unnamed reef.
6. The territorial sea begins at the low-water mark. but is of unspecified breadth.
"The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a distance
from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea."
Convention on the Territorial Sea, Article 6.
7. Atlantis had acquired the rights of a Mr. Timothy Thomas Anderson who had
explored the area in 1962. Mr. Anderson's idea of the reef' development included
constructing a fishing club, a marina, a skin diving club, a hotel and a gambling casino.
Stang, Wet Land: Tie Unavailabhle Re.oturce o1 the Outer ('ontinental Shell, 2 J. LAW &

I CON.

)IVIn.-oIM.NT

153. 168 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Stang, Wet Land].

8. Atlantis envisioned a sovereign nation at a cost of approximately $250,000,000
housing a radio and television station, post office, building offices, stamp department and
foreign offices, government palace, congress, international bank and mint. A gambling
casino was also in the offing. United States v. Ray. supra note 4 at 535-36,
9. Both Atlantis and its predecessor. Anderson, had made every effort "to have
legal rights ascertained in a peaceful fashion through established tribunals and not by selfhelp . . . . [They had] patiently sought permission from all governmental agencies, state
and federal just short of the United Nations but to no avail." Atlantis Development
Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1967).
10. Id. at 821. The State of Florida replied that the property was "outside the
Constitutional Boundaries of the State of Florida and therefore not within the jurisdiction
of the T.I.I.F. [Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund]." Id. at 820. (This is true
because of the three-mile territorial sea).
Stating in its reply, "[tlhe Department of the Interior has no jurisdiction over land
that is outside the territorial limits of the United States,- Atlantis was referred to the
Department of State. The Department of State replied: "The areas in question are
outside the jurisdiction of the United States and constitute a part of the high seas. The
high seas are open to all nations and no state may validly subject any part of them to its
sovereignty .. .- Id. at 821.
II. Relying on the replies received, supra note 10, Atlantis incurred approximately
S50,000 in costs for "investigations, tests, experiments, surveys, and construction of four
prefabricated buildings." Stang, Wet Land 168.
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obstructing navigation without a permit.12 Defendant Acme 3

subsequently applied to the Corps of Engineers for a permit to
dredge and bulkhead the waters at or near Triumph Reef.

Pending decision on Acme's application, Atlantis objected,"
claiming prior rights. Acme's permit was denied, but Acme and
defendant Ray nonetheless dredged and filled two areas at

Triumph and one at Long Reef.
A suit by the Government against the defendants resulted in

the granting of a preliminary injunction to halt all dredging,
filling or similar destructive activity on the reefs. 5 Atlantis had
moved to intervene in the Government's action and intervention

was denied"6 by the trial court, but allowed on appeal 7 under the
1966 amendment to Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
8
Procedure."
12. The Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (1964),
creates authority in the Secretary of the Army, through the Corps of Engineers, to
prevent obstructions to navigation in the navigable waters of the United States. The
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act [hereinafter cited as OCSLA] 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et
seq. (1964) read in conjunction with the Rivers and Harbors Act extends the authority of
the Secretary of the Army to prevent obstruction to navigation to artificial islands and
fixed structures on the Continental Shelf. Thus, any construction in navigable waters
within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Army, absent approval by the Department
of the Army, is unlawful and punishable as a misdemeanor. Removal may be enforced by
injunction. 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1964).
The Corps of Engineers requested that Atlantis remove the structures and
discontinue construction operatipns. Atlantis then asked the Corps to reconsider and
withdraw its request. Attorney for Atlantis was notified "that after consultation with
various federal agencies," the original notice that a permit was required for the proposed
construction, was affirmed. United States v. Ray, supra note 4 at 537.
13. Defendant Ray was, at this time, President of Acme General Contractors, Inc.
14. In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is stated:
While this application was pending, the Corps of Engineers issued public
notice thereof, sending a copy to the intervenor. The intervenor filed written
objections . . . asserting its claim to ownership of the area . . . and stating
that the intervenor was considering appropriate means of obtaining judicial
determination of the questions under consideration with the Office of the
Chief of Engineers.
United States v. Ray, supra note 4 at 537.
15. United States v. Ray, 281 F. Supp. 876 (S.D. Fla. 1965).
16. The district court denied intervention as a matter of right and declined to permit
permissive intervention. Atlantis sought to intervene by way of proposed answer asserting
lack of United States territorial jurisdiction, dominion or ownership in or over the reefs
and to cross-claim, asserting that defendants were trespassers on property to which
Atlantis had gained title. Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th
Cir. 1967).
17. Id.
18. The court, in Atlantis Pevelopment Corp. v. United States, felt that the
application of Atlantis claimed a sufficient interest relating to the property or
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The action was tried again in February, 1969.'1 In a
memorandum opinion by Chief Justice Fulton, held injunction

granted: (1) the reefs are a part of the seabed and subsoil of the
United States under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act" and

the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf;2 1 (2) the
construction was destroying irreplaceable natural resources of the
seabed of the Continental Shelf appertaining to the United

States; 22 (3) the district court had jurisdiction over the
controversy in that defendants and intervenor were engaged in

"developing" the seabed and resources of the Continental
Shelf;2 and, (4) construction, dredging and bulkheading atop the
reefs created artificial islands and fixed structures on the Outer

Continental Shelf, thus requiring a construction permit from the
Secretary of the Army.2 4 United States v. Ray, 294 F. Supp. 532
(S.D. Fla. 1969).

The only governmental allegation which the court would not
sustain was that the activities of defendants and intervenor
constituted a trespass. Basing its denial upon an interpretation of
existing legislation, the Ray court, aided by a recent law review
article,? concluded that the United States had never claimed title
to the Continental Shelf or asserted sovereign ownership over it
by way of congressional or presidential act. On the contrary, the
court found that the United States merely claims the right to
regulate the exploration and exploitation of the shelf and to
transaction which is the subject of the action to allow intervention. Atlantis' interest
was not represented by any party and the allowance of intervention would work no
injustice. Id. at 825.
19. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act gives trial court jurisdiction to the
district court, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (1964).
20. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq. (1964). As defined by this act,
[tihe term "outer Continental Shelf" means all submerged lands lying
seaward and outside of the [territorial sea] . . . and of which the subsoil and
seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and
control ...
43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964).
21. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Sept. 15, 1958 [1964] I U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578 [hereinafter cited as Shelf Convention].
22. 59 STAT. 884 (1945); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq. (1964). Though the reefs are
stable enough to support the construction, the court received testimony to the effect that
the reefs would die as a result of the dredging, bulkheading and construction. United
States v. Ray, supra note 4 at 538.
23. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (1964).
24. Id. at § 1333(f) (1964).
2-. Stang, Wet Land. The court appears to have relied extensively upon the research
and reasoning of Mr. Stang.
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ensure the safety of navigation, 26 and that a trespass claim requires
a showing of title, or alternatively, actual possession of the area
affected, by the party asserting the cause of action.
However, the court did state that
[w]hatever proprietary interest exists with respect to these
reefs belongs to the United States under both national (Shelf
Act) and international (Shelf Convention) law. Although this
interest may be limited, it is nevertheless the only interest
recognized by law, and such interest in the United States
precludes the claims of defendants and intervenor 7
The action is being appealed by all partiesY s In an analysis of the
Ray decision, the following discussion will consider the claim of
29
trespass and the court's findings in. this regard.
THE CONTINENTAL SHELF

The Continental Shelf doctrine "0 proclaims that the
resources of the seabed and subsoil of the area adjacent to the
coastal state are subject, ipso jurgl to its exclusive jurisdiction
and control for purposes of exploration and exploitation. In its
legal context,3 2 the shelf begins at the outer limits of the
territorial waters33 of a coastal state 4 Its outer limits35 as well as
26. Stang, Wet Land at 180.
27. United States v. Ray, supra note 4 at 542.
28. Letter from J. Francis Hayden, attorney for intervenor, to writer, March 18,

1969.
29. For a consideration of the concepts involved in determining the character of the
reef and an excellent discussion of the court's reasoning see Stang, Wet Land. For
intervenor's arguments, see Trial Memorandum on Behalf of Intervenor, United States v.
Ray, 294 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
30. Shelf Convention, Article 2.
31. I A. SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 190 (Coast and Geodetic Survey
Pub. 10-1 1964) [hereinafter cited as SHALOWITZ].
32. The legal and the geographical (supra note I) definitions of the Continental
Shelf differ greatly. The legal definition varies according to the claim of the coastal state.
33. Shelf Convention, Article 1. The territorial sea is a zone bordering the coast of a
littoral state and is susceptible of ownership in the international sense of sovereignty.
Customary international law decrees that the state's sovereignty extends equally to the
seabed, waters and airspace of this zone. 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW

7-13 (1935).

34. The terms state, or, coastal state, are used throughout this article to denote an
international legal entity.
35. The outer limits of the Continental Shelf, much like the outer limits of the
territorial sea remain definitionally imprecise due to conflicting claims of coastal states.
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a universally accepted" definition of the shelf remain to be
determined. In the words of the Geneva Convention,
the term "continental shelf" is used as referring (a) to the
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of
200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural
resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of
similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands3
This imprecise definition, resulting in a twofold test for
determining shelf area (the 200 meter isobath plus the depth of
exploitability), combines with differing theories as to the extent
of a coastal state's jurisdiction and control over it to form the
basis of legal controversies 5 over shelf areas.
A.

United States Claims to the Shelf

To avoid any suggestion of an unreasonable encroachment
upon the freedom of the seas, the United States has carefully
limited the terminology of its claims to jurisdiction, controP and
power of disposition0 by excluding the word "sovereignty" or
any assertion of ownership and by declaring that its proprietary
interest in the Continental Shelf is sui generis.
Unlike sovereign ownership of the territorial waters, rights
exercised by the United States over the Continental Shelf
constituted something less than a fee simple.' They were rights
of a limited nature, on a horizontal plane. The theory of a
36. As stated by Grunawalt:
[The Geneva Convention] . . . definition of the continental shelf represents

no clear victory for any school of thought on the subject. It is, in fact, a
compromise which seeks to satisfy the proponents of the virtues of
uniformity, fixity and certitude as well as the advocates of the need for
flexibility.
Grunawalt at 118.
37. Shelf Convention, Article I.
38. Disputes arise in reference to: the outer limits of the shelf so as to define the
beginning of the deep sea floor; the extent of control which a coastal state may exert over
the shelf; the rights of landlocked states; the rights of littoral states without a shelf in the
geological-geographical sense; historical claims of states which assert rights to resources
on the shelf of another state; the obligation of states not party to the Convention to
comply with it.
39. 59 STAT. 884 (1945).
40. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
41. United States v. Ray, supra note 4 at 540.
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horizontal extension of jurisdiction and control was first
enunciated in the Truman Proclamation of 1945:
[T]he Government of the United States regards the natural
resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf
beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the
United States as appertaining
to the United States, subject to
42
its jurisdiction and control
Justifications for this proclamation were: (1)the shelf is an
extension of the land mass of the contiguous state; (2) the oil and
mineral resources of the shelf underlie, in part, the territorial
waters; and, (3) self-protection in the international community
compels coastal states to keep watch over activities along their
shores.43 The extension was characterized as horizontal so as to
leave unaffected the high seas and airspace beyond the territorial
waters of the nation.
The enactment of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act in
195311 added the term "power of disposition" to the United
States claims that the subsoil and seabed, as well as the
resources of the shelf appertain to and are subject to the
jurisdiction and control of the United States. 5 Again, the
character of the high seas, as well as navigation and fishing
rights, were to remain unaffected.46 The position of limited shelf
jurisdiction appears to be founded upon a fear that assertion of
actual ownership would result in claims by other coastal states to
the high seas and airspace above the Continental Shelf, outside
territorial waters.
42. 59 STAT. 884 (1945). For an analysis of the Truman Proclamation see 4 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 871-82 (1965). This Proclamation, based
upon the theory of contiguity, is generally regarded as the first of any magnitude to deal
with the Continental Shelf. It was preceded by the United Kingdom-Venezuela Treaty of
1942 which provided for the division of the seabed of the Gulf of Paria between
Venezuela and Trinidad. Grunawalt at I II n.34. This treaty was not expressed in terms of
the Continental Shelf.
Though no definition of the term "continental shelf" was given in the Proclamation,
a press release of the same date by the State Department, indicated that the shelf was
delimited by the 200 meter isobath. 13 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 484 (1945). The Truman
Proclamation is seen as an expression, not of what the law was, but of what the law
should be. Grunawalt at 112.
43. Grunawalt at 112.
44. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq. (1964).
45. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1964).
46. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1964).
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However, in 1958, the Geneva Conference adopted 7 the
Convention on the Continental Shelf which reads in part:
The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its
natural resources.
The rights . . . are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal
State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its
natural resources, no one may undertake these activities, or
make a claim to the continental shelf, without the express
consent of the coastal State.
The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do
not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any
express proclamation 8
The term "sovereign rights" represented a compromise in
terminology between states wishing to use the word
"sovereignty" 49 and the United States' desire to assert "exclusive
rights." 50 Apprehension over unreasonable encroachment upon
the freedom of the seas should have been quieted when it was
agreed at Geneva that the legal status of the superjacent waters
and the airspace were unaffected by claims of sovereign rights.,
47. Shelf Convention, adopted April 26, 1958.
There were a total of 86 states in attendance at the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, at Geneva, Switzerland, from February 24 to April 28, 1958, voting
upon the proposed codification of international law as developed by the International
Law Commission between 1949 and 1958. 46 states signed the Shelf Convention.
48. Shelf Convention, Article 2(l) - (3) (emphasis added).
49. In considering the text of Article 2(l) of the Shelf Convention, a Mexican
proposal read: "The coastal State exercises sovereignty over the sea-bed and subsoil of
" The voting was 24 for, 37 against and 6 abstentions. Other
the continental shelf ....
states had made similar proposals employing the word sovereignty. Whiteman,
Conference on the Law of the Sea: Convention on the ContinentalShelf, 52 At. J. INT'L
LAw 629, 637 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Whiteman, Convention on the Continental
Shell].
50. The United States representative to the Geneva Conference later explained:
It was well known, of course, that certain states desired that rights with
respect to the continental shelf should affect the legal status of the waters
above the shelf and the superjacent airspace, [sic] In that light, at least, it
seemed desirable to some states, including the United States, to "play it
safe" by avoiding the use of the term "sovereignty," or even "sovereign
rights" in defining the relation of the coastal state to the continental
shelf. ...
The United States proposed . . . the deletion of the word "sovereign"
and the substitution of the word "exclusive" . . . so that the article would
read: "The coastal state exercises over the continental shelf exclusive rights
for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural resources."
Whiteman, Convention on the Continental Shelf at 636.
51. Shelf Convention, Article 3. Seeing that the waters and airspace were to be
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The Ray decision, however, would appear to perpetuate this
apprehension by defining the words "sovereign rights" to mean
exclusive jurisdiction and control, and not sovereignty.
Historically, sovereignty, like title, has connoted a vertical as
well as a horizontal claim of ownership. Because United States
claims are limited to horizontal extensions, the court was, in its
judgment, obligated to deny the trespass claim. It is submitted
that the distinction between the rights asserted by the United
States over the shelf, and an assertion of sovereign ownership is
an illusory, definitional difference.
B.

Extensions of United States Domestic Law

Through federal legislation dealing with public lands,52 the
United States has applied its territorial legal system to the
Continental Shelf:
The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction
of the United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of
the outer Continental Shelf ....
[T]he civil and criminal laws of each adjacent state . . .
are declared to be the law of the United States for that
portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental
Shelf

.

. which would be within the area of the State if its

boundaries were extended seaward to the outer margin on the
outer Continental Shelf.

. .

This broad extension of domestic law is accented by specific
grants of power through congressional acts and administrative
authority, and underscores United States dominion of the
shelf-in fact, if not in law 4 The complete control exerted over
unaffected no matter which wording was employed in Article 2, "the United States, in
order that the article should find wider support, found itself in a position to recede from
its former position [supra note 50] and support the . . wording of 'sovereign rights' in
place of 'exclusive rights.' " Whiteman, Convention on the Continental Shelf at 637.
52. Title 43 U.S.C. (1964) deals exclusively with public lands. Included in the
definition of oublic lands are:
the surface and subsurface resources of all such lands, including the
disposition or restriction on disposition of the mineral resources in lands
defined by appropriate statute, treaty, or judicial determination as being
under the control of the United States in the Outer Continental Shelf.
43 U.S.C. § 1400(g) (1964).
53. 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
54. The Secretary of the Army is authorized to prevent obstruction to navigation, 43
U.S.C. § 1333(f) (1964); The Secretary of the Interior may lease portions of the
Continental Shelf for oil and mineral exploitation, 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (1964), 43
C.F.R. § 3380.0-3; The United States Fish and Wildlife Service may veto shelf leases by

SAN DIEGO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 6

the shelf area should be contrasted with the very limited degree
of jurisdiction and control which may be exercised over the
waters above the shelf 5 The extent of jurisdiction and control
exercised by the United States over the shelf would appear to be
more than sufficient to acquire title, or to demonstrate actual
possession. Though the words "title,"
"ownership"
or
"sovereignty" have never been employed, the words "sovereign
rights" and "appertain" have. The distinction is not readily
apparent.
United States domestic legislation, in the international
realm, is significant to the extent that it is evidence of this
nation's position with regard to international law. 6 Bearing in
mind that the purpose of the Continental Shelf doctrine is to
enable the coastal state to protect and preserve its shelf,' it would
be reasonable, if activities similar to Ray are to be proscribed, to
alter the United States position and admit title to the Shelf. The
shelf is treated in all respects as if the United States claimed title
to it. Denying title constitutes an open invitation to conduct
commercial activities which may not be enjoined without first
determining that title to the shelf and its resources is vested in
the United States.
The United States, however, has never accepted the theory
that the Continental Shelf is subject to acquisition in a territorial
sense. It has rejected the res omnium communis7 concept but
has been unwilling to espouse its opposite, res nullius,58 as
the Interior on grounds of protection and conservation, Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 661 (1964); the President may declare shelf areas to be National
Monuments [Key Largo Coral Reef Preserve, 74 STAT. c48-50 (1960) and Bisdayne
National Monument, 82 STAT. 1188 (1968)]; and the Coast Guard is authorized to
regulate maintenance of artificial islands and fixed structures on the Continental Shelf, 33
C.F.R. §§ 140-146 (1968).
55. The United States has jurisdiction over customs, fiscal, immigration and
sanitation activities in a 9 mile contiguous zone, bordering on the territorial sea, over the
Continental Shelf, Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea, Article 24; and the United

States has withdrawn international fishing rights from this 9 mile zone. 80

STAT.

908

(1966).
56. Grunawalt at 116 n.50.
57. Belonging to all states equally. Grunawalt at 105. This theory would accord with

proposals that the shelf must be held in trust for the international community as a whole,
For a discussion of the schools of thought which take the position that the Continental
Shelf, like the superjacent high seas, is incapable of acquisition and that the two should
stand together, see Oda, A Reconsideration of the ContinentalShelf Doctrine, 32 TL. L.
REV.

21, 33 (1957).
58. Belonging to no one, but capable of being acquired. Grunawalt at 105. As stated
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appropriate. Instead, it adheres to the proposition that a coastal
state's proprietary interest in the shelf is unique and is not to be
found within the traditional doctrines of ownership. However, the
legal system, national and international, which is applied to the
shelf has included the proposition that territory is either subject
to acquisition or it is not. If it is not, it is held in community by
everyone. It is inconceivable that the legal precedents evolved
from traditional doctrines can be sufficiently manipulated so as
to afford practical solutions to all future shelf controversies t
It may be fair to say that the holding of the Ray case is
based more upon a concern for national security than national
resources. The United States has never claimed that coral is
among the resources which it wishes to exploit." In fact, coral
appears to have been excluded from any listings of claimed
resources." Additionally, neither defendants nor intervenoTs
intended to claim rights to the coral except as a platform upon
by one legal theorist, the res nullius theory of lands acquired by occupation would result
in
[r]ights . . . vest[ing] in the occupant, no matter whence he came or how
tenuous his prior connection with the region. A principle which permitted
such a situation would rightly seem intolerable to most coastal states, and
especially so to one unable to proceed immediately with the development on
its own account. Considerations of security, of trade and navigation, of
pollution, and of customs and revenue, would all militate against recognition
of such a doctrine.
Young, The Legal Status of Submarine Areas Beneath the High Seas, 45 Ai. J. INT'L
LAW 225, 230 (1951).
59. Grunawalt suggests that it is difficult, if not impossible to apply concepts
created to handle land area problems to the bed of the sea, and that perhaps an entirely
new "pigeonhole" should be created. Grunawalt at 107-111. As noted by a leading
theorist:
[i]t is a mistake to think that by some ingenious manipulation of existing
legal doctrines we can always find a solution for the problems of a changing
international world. That is not so; for many of these problems . . . the only
remedy is that States should be willing to take measures to bring the legal
situation into accord with new needs, and if States are not reasonable enough
to do that, we must not expect the existing law to relieve them of the
consequences.
J. BRIERLY, THE LAW oF NATIONS 264 (5th ed. 1955).
60. The Secretary of the Interior was authorized to publish a list, in the Federal
Register, of the resources claimed by the United States as falling within the sedentary
species. 16 U.S.C. § 1085(b) (1964). This list has yet to be published. It is noted in this
context that the United States does not, apparently, hold coral to fall within the
definition of minerals. 48 U.S.C. § 1701(f) (1964).
61. The Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(e) (1964), provides:
The term "natural resources" includes, without limiting the generality
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which to construct their buildings. 2 It would appear that the

court was anxious to find some authority to rid the coasts of
entrepreneurial adventurers without contravening the practice of
protesting any assertions of sovereignty in the Continental Shelf
by other states and avoiding such assertions by the United
States 3
ABALONIA

Another" recent attempt to make use of the shelf was
defeated in much the same manner as in Ray. Abalonia was to
thereof, oil, gas, and all other minerals, and fish, shrimp, oysters, clams,
crabs, lobster, sponges, kelp and other marine animal and plant life...
The court, in Ray, states that "[ihe Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act incorporates the
definition of natural resources which is contained in the Submerged Lands Act ... "
United States v. Ray supra note 4 at 539. But this is contradicted by a statement of Miss
Whiteman, United States representative at Geneva in 1958. Miss Whiteman stated that
the definition of "natural resources" in Section 1301(e) related solely to the land and
water of the country's territorial sea "and bore no relation to the outer continental
Shelf." 10th Meeting of the Fourth Committee 19-20, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42.
Additionally, the inclusion of "fish," "shrimp," and "lobster" is inconsistent with
the definition of natural resources in Article 2(4) Shelf Convention. As noted by the
International Law Commission: "This definition (article 2, natural resources] excludes
such crustaceans as shrimp, but it does give coastal states such as Australia the right to
control oyster beds and pearl fisheries." Int'l Law Comm. Report, U.N. Gen'l Assembly,
I Ith Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 9, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 31/59.
62. Trial Memorandum on Behalf of Intervenor at 4, 33, United States v. Ray,
supra note 29. This is also evident from the argument of intervenor that if the reef was
not seabed, the United States had no territorial jurisdiction over it. This is arguable since
the intervenor was not "exploiting" the reefs in the conventional sense of the term, but
merely wanted to claim the upper surface as a platform upon which to put its building.
63. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra. A 1945 statement by Eugene H.
Doomen, Office of Assistant Secretary of State Dunn, to the Office of the Secretary of
State concerning the Continental Shelf policy would appear to support this conclusion:
It was not our desire to reserve the resources of the continental shelf to
nationals of this country any more than it was the policy of the United
States to exclude foreigners from participating in the exploitation of the
mineral resources of the United States itself. Our primary concern was to
assert the necessary control over such operations off the coasts of the United
States to guard against the depletion of our mineral resources and to
regulate, from the point of view of security, the activities of foreigners in
proximity to our coast.
4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 754 (1965).
Shortly after the issuance of the Truman Proclamation, 59 STAT. 884 (1945),
Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Peru and Ecuador claimed sovereignty over Continental Shelf
areas. The United States issued formal diplomatic protests against the sovereignty claims
as being inconsistent with the principle of freedom of the seas. See, e.g., N1. MOUTON,
THE CONTINENTAL SHELF

89-96 (1952).

64. A third group of enterprising entrepreneurs, operating independently of the
Atlantis and Abalonia promoters, attempted to gain permission to construct Taluga, a
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be a nation on the Cortes Bank, a sea shallow rich in abalone
and lobster, approximately 110 miles off the coast of San Diego,
California. The nation's base, a reinforced concrete ship, was
towed to the shallow and moored, but a mooring line broke
before the ship could be sunk at the two fathom depth and it
sank in deeper water. The Corps of Engineers quickly gave

notice that the ship was a hazard to navigation and the
government declared the area to be a part of the Outer
Continental Shelff 5
Because of the configuation of the shelf, the depth of the
water between the coast and the Cortes Bank exceeds 1200

meters in some places. 6 The shallow is, therefore, beyond the 200
meter isobath delimitation of Shelf area and beyond the present
depth of exploitability. Should suit be instituted, the government

may have considerable difficulty litigating its "sovereign rights"
over the Bank.

7

The shallow itself would fall within the "depth

of exploitability" delimitation if it could first be established that
the area was legally a part of the Continental Shelf in spite of

intervening depths. A mere declaration that an area is a part of
the Shelf is not conclusive and the initial hurdle will be

establishing as a matter of law that the Bank is upon the
Continental Shelf6 But, assuming arguendo, that the "depth of
exploitability"

test is applicable, the Government nevertheless

new nation to consist of four islands on the Cortes Bank. (See text,accompanying note

65, infra). The group, operating out of Seattle, Washington, was informed by the Corps
of Engineers that the area was part of the Continental Shelf and that permission from the
Secretary of the Army would be required. Taluga is still in the planning stages, but it is
suggested by Mr. Stang, in his article, that the promoters of both Taluga and Abalonia
are awaiting the outcome of the Ray decision, and its final appeal, before making any
further moves. Stang, Wet Land at 183-86.
65. 3 GEOMARINE TECHNOLOGY, No. 2, 9-12 (Feb. 1967). The declaration that the
area was part of the Continental Shelf was in the form of published leasing maps in the
Federal Register, 31 Fed. Reg. 16629 (1966). Further evidence of United States
assertions of jurisdiction over the Cortes Bank are to be found in a letter from the Corps
of Engineers to the Taluga (supra note 64) promoters, stating that the Cortes Bank is
part of the United States outer Continental Shelf. Stang, Wet Land at 186.
66. 3 GEOMARINE TECHNOLOGY, No. 2, 9-12 (Feb. 1967). Contradicting facts are
found in Kruger, Mineral Development on the Continental Shell and Beyond, 42 J. ST.

B. CALIF. 515, 521 (1967). In this article, Mr. Kruger states that the Cortes Bank lies
approximately 120 miles offshore, and that the depths between the shore and the bank
exceed 6800 feet with the shallow less than 50 feet deep in some places.
67. The promoters, at one time threatened with prosecution, will apparently not be
sued if they do not resume their project. Stang, Wet Land at 184 n.163.
68. The depth of exploitability test appears to have been designed to protect coastal
states, such as Japan, who do not have a Continental Shelf in the geological-geographical
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will be confronted by assertions that lobster are not
internationally recognized as one of the resources which are
subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal state.6 9 Thus, even if the

Bank is a part of the shelf, activities may escape injunction by
reason of the Government's failure to admit title to or ownership

of the shelf.
CONCLUSION

The extension of national legal systems to enforce assertions
of jurisdiction, control and power of disposition of the
Continental Shelf and its resources is potentially more dangerous
to the international community and its attempt to promote an
orderly division of the ocean's wealth, than would be an extension
of ownership or sovereignty. National legal systems differ whereas
ownership is an international concept. That this ownership would
sense. The test was not designed to extend the shelf to the ocean depths because of
technological advances or the existence of a sea shallow in an area distant from the shore.
However, a spokesman for the United States Department of the Interior has asserted that
there is no objection to the federal leasing of areas beyond the 100 fathom
contour line and that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act extends to all
submerged lands seaward of a coastal State's offshore boundary and the
waters superjacent thereto over which the U.S. asserts jurisdiction ....
[Thus] the limits of the outer continental shelf leasing under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act should be considered as technological rather
than geographical limits and . . . the leasing authority under the Act extends
as far seaward as technological ability can cope with the water depth.
Schoenberger, Outer ContinentalShelf Leasing, LAW OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASLS
303, 305 (1964).
However, it is doubtful that a sea shallow a thousand or so miles from the shore
would, even under this definition, fall within the outer Continental Shelf, since at some
point the Shelf ends and the deep sea floor begins.
69. Even the United States would appear to exclude lobster (though it would include
abalone) as natural resources of the shelf, under the Article 2, Shelf Convention definition
of "living organisms belonging to the sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which,
at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to
move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil."
However, lobster is specifically listed in the Submerged Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1301(e) (1964) (see note 61 supra).
As pointed out in a recent article by Oda:
At the Geneva Conference of 1958, a number of European countries,
including Sweden, Norway, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Greece,
Spain and Japan, insisted that continental shelf resources be limited, to
mineral resources. A Japanese delegate warned that the inclusion of sedentary
fisheries in the concept of the continental shelf would lead to a restriction of
the freedom- of the seasa . . .
Oda, The Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea: Some Suggestions /or Their

Revision,

NATURAL RESOURCES LAWYER,

103, 104 (1967).
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be of a horizontal nature should be apparent from a reading of
the Geneva Conventions.
The Geneva Conventions were reconsidered in June, 196970
Should it be decided that the Continental Shelf is to be limited
to a defined breadth, the differences among national legal
systems would be of no consequence. If, on the other hand, the
outer limits of the shelf remain undefined, a claim of title to and
ownership of the Shelf would inject a reasonable degree of
uniformity into an otherwise impossibly vague legal concept.
Until now, the United States has skirted the title issue.
Attempts to populate the shelf have been successfully restricted
because the planners were United States nationals or, if of
foreign nationality, have in their operations had sufficient
contacts with the United States to subject them to its
jurisdiction. But, more problematical controversies are bound to
arise, and the Ray decision, supplemented by the authority
advanced to prevent Cortes Bank operations, fails to take into
consideration potential future operations which may not obstruct
navigation, or, which may not be thwarted without a showing of
shelf ownership.
SHERRY ECKHARDT
70. The Convention was to be open for possible revision on June 10, 1969. Foell,
Nations, Large and Small Rush to Control Seabeds, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 23,
1969, § 1, at 1, col. 3. The result of the revisions, if any, is not known at the time of this

writing.

